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Evaluation of an Anti-Monopoly 
Programme in Hungarian Public Utilities
Tamás M. Horváth
iNtroductioN
Hungary used to be an example of strong decentralised local govern-
ment, but that has now changed. The transition system that was intro-
duced in 1990 delegated quite a lot of functions to municipalities. 
Every settlement was granted local government of its own, but without 
enough incentives to cooperate in order to be more effective in service 
provision. The local level was strengthened by the privatisation process 
in the 1990s, because municipalities received income and shares in this 
process. Nevertheless, private monopolies then became stronger, some-
times against the interests of local governments and regulatory bod-
ies. The originally introduced wide range of responsibilities and at the 
same time independence that remained fragmented was not sufficient to 
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maintain municipal financial positions strongly enough. So, the level of 
local democracy was relatively high at the beginning of the system transi-
tion, but weaknesses emerged in its effectiveness.
This longstanding tradition of transformation of the system at local 
and regional levels became the basis of the dramatic turn in the policy of 
the nation state from 2010. Concerning the municipal system, the gov-
ernment strategy became one of extreme centralisation. Local authori-
ties lost most of their service providing functions; institutions formerly 
maintained by them were centralised. In addition, regional development 
became a function of the nation state.
From 2010, several measures were undertaken to centralise prof-
its from the energy, water, waste and other (funeral, park maintenance, 
chimney sweeping services) public utility sectors. Providers are now 
burdened with a central tax levied on public utility networks. A general 
cut in prices of user charges is required and a new supervisory fee has 
been introduced for an administrative regulatory authority. Additionally, 
municipal utilities were exempted from some of the taxes, but this is no 
longer the case and the financial burden for municipal utilities is now 
heavier, especially for the central government.
All in all the structure of the system formally remained the same at 
two levels (municipal and county), however, the functional, financial 
and ownership position of local government has already changed dra-
matically. In this circumstances local distribution from GDP decreased by 
onethird, from 11.4% (2008) to 7.76% (2014) (OECD).
theoreticaL frameWorks aNd methods of the study
The direct theoretical background of the paper is threefold. First, coun-
try-specific but contextual crises studies are based on explanatory research 
(Hajnal 2014; Hajnal and Rosta 2016) of the present turn in the devel-
opment of Hungary. Second, different concepts of “re-public’’ solutions 
have recently been used as explanatory variables like the concept of remu-
nicipalisation (Hall 2012; Pigeon et al. 2012; Water Remunicipalisation 
Tracker) and the re-emergence of municipal corporations(Wollmann and 
Marcou 2010). In addition, the policy of direct centralisation has been 
scrutinised by Horváth (2016) on this basis. Third, programme evalua-
tion studies of public sector (Wollmann 2003) and institutional reforms 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2011) at intergovernmental levels are based 
on the ex-post control of logic in anticipated policy programmes.
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A quantitative, performance, ex-post evaluation is the focus of this 
study. The relationship to the paradigm of New Public Management 
(NPM) is at the centre of the evaluation. It has been criticised heavily 
by the present Hungarian central government, which involves the denial 
of market-orientation in most of the public services and open compe-
tition for foreign investors. National interest is very much emphasised 
nowadays in public policies, even in sector ones. Official communication 
is built upon national community-based statements. It seems that voters 
at least have been convinced notwithstanding the further consequences.
In the meantime, evaluation as a management technique is working in 
Hungary, linked especially to past and ongoing projects of the European 
Union. For instance, pre-accession funds (PHARE, ISPA, development 
funds for small regions) had been evaluated, as well as national development 
programmes linked to the budget cycles during membership of the EU 
(since 2004). Recently, in the 2010s, this type of evaluation has been clearly 
split from the analysis of the national government’s programme as a whole, 
for different reasons. First of all, it is based on different preferences than 
those focused on by NPM. This paper tries to go back to the NPM view and 
adopt some components of classical approaches to evaluate, for example, the 
basis of measurement in effectiveness, rather than ideological attributes.
PoLicy Programme desigN
After the international credit crisis (2008) and a moderate sovereign debt 
crisis (in the same decade) the former management structure of pub-
lic services was questioned in Hungary. Social conflicts led to radical-
ism in politics. The effect on municipal activities and functions became 
very restrictive. In response, the regulatory position of the state was 
enhanced, and central government preferences were greatly widened. In 
some European countries the crises have led to corrections in the compe-
tition policy of public services. In Greece, as a comparable case, munic-
ipal overspending had to be abandoned, with a turn to NPM-inspired 
alternative solutions of service delivery. This policy involves increasing 
the roles of private actors either as investors or volunteers. In strong 
contrast, the Hungarian case is one showing a trend towards pure cen-
tralism. The Hungarian model has led to an extreme version of central 
influence leading to extensive state intervention. The aim of the national 
government seems to be to shift public utilities to non-profit-making ser-
vices. In this case, the role of municipalities has not yet been specified, 
nor has the providers’ presumed counter interest.
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The corporate government in the infrastructural sector came to the 
attention of the right wing national government of Viktor Orbán very 
early after the election win in 2010 and its subsequent re-election in 
2014. It obtained a two-thirds majority in both the Parliament and in 
most of the city assemblies. According to their narrative, the former type 
of economic power was based on earlier political bargaining called pri-
vatisation by liberals, who were leading supporters of the transformation 
process from the formal system transition (1990) to joining the European 
Union (2004). The nationalist government coalition, consisting of so-
called national conservatives supplemented with Christian Democrats, 
differentiated from but supported by extremists, wanted to remake origi-
nally long-term contracts in order to change the players of the game.
The policy programme on public utilities is involved in the start-
ing manifesto of the government elected in 2010 named as “System of 
National Cooperation” (SNC). Referring to public utilities there are 
three main focuses (SNC 2010, 24).
(i)  Because of strong market monopolies in service provision the aim 
of the government is to destroy the power of these companies.
(ii)  High energy prices are not justified by the average price levels of 
the surrounding countries therefore stronger direct regulation 
and supervision are needed according to the programme.
(iii)  Reallocation in ownership structure is the preferred solution of 
the government against private monopolies.
Changes on the basis of these motives are as follows.
1.  The really specific context of the Hungarian case is that the Prime 
Minister, Viktor Orbán, argued this issue in a political speech in 
20141 and his general political attitude to the public was that for-
eign private companies had abused their dominant position by 
overcharging for their services. That was why the national conserv-
atives wanted to buy back shares of these companies. This was one 
of the key motivations for changing the political system (Hajnal 
2014) and market relations, including public services provision. 
The national conservative ideology here paradoxically focuses on 
state-centred solutions for every conflicting social or economic 
issue. Market orientation shifted to state-centred defence of so-
called national interests.
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 In the background there is an economic logic linked to user charges. 
To understand the recent situation let us go back to the transfor-
mation process. From that time user charges once again became an 
important element of public financial transfers. User charges are also 
forms of systemic financing mainly in public utility services. The long 
history of transition countries demonstrates that these sources may 
also be considered transfers depending on the decision regarding 
which level of government may collect them. In communist countries 
most urban services, like water and sewerage, central heating and solid 
waste collection, were free or the price was a symbolic payment. Some 
services were subsidised centrally, particularly electricity and gas.
 In the period of transformation giving these revenues “back” to gov-
ernments became a decision on financial transfers. This sector transi-
tion process was composed of several steps. First, starting from the 
1990s, prices were to be liberalised in the public sector. This was 
important even if the state enterprises were the only providers at the 
beginning. Second, conditions for competition had to be established. 
An emerging market was built up with privatisation for these services 
parallel with the multiplying number of service providers. This was 
an opportunity to decide about the application of user charges.
 In principle user charges are good for some different purposes of 
local government. These include covering costs and maximising rev-
enues, and they can act as an incentive for economical use. According 
to the theory (Bird et al. 1995), the importance of user charges is 
that municipalities can behave as service providers. It means the cor-
rect (roughly marginal cost) price is achieved for public consumers. 
In the new situation the government politically criticised foreign pro-
viders for monopolist user charges. Additionally, after the elections a 
number of criminal cases were brought against top managers in pub-
lic utility companies accusing them of political corruption.
2.  However, on the basis of this radical political concept, there are 
quite a few arguments, based on pure economic interests, which 
seem to explain their motivation. First of all, an easy explanation 
is shown by the national government with the support of con-
sumer price indexes. It is illustrated in Fig. 1. The interrupted line 
below (signified by the arrow also) is the level of total Consumer 
Price Index in Hungary between years 2003 and 2012. The level 
of water pipe services, solid waste management and disposal, waste 
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water treatment, central heating and warm water services are typi-
cally at a higher level continuously. The rise of prices is higher in 
these sectors than the actual inflation rate. As an exception, an 
extreme increase in the price of central heating was compensated 
by the former government. However, others remained on the 
upper level when the nationalist government started its term from 
2010. According to the official argument, utility companies, espe-
cially their foreign private owners, pulled out profits from house-
holds, that is to say, from “the nation”.
3.  Behind this argument there are criticisms of two different inherited 
basic scenarios in the ownership structure of public utility compa-
nies which had arisen by the 2000s. One is the model of formerly 
privatised companies, which was condemned for uncontrolled 
monopolisation by the new government powers. The other model, 
of companies remaining in municipal hands, was also criticised 
heavily, because it was seen as the background of former govern-
ment parties either at local or national levels.
As far as the first scenario is concerned, it was true that the solutions 
of privatisation implemented in the public utility sector were rather dif-
ferent. In order to understand this issue properly, let us turn to Bauby 
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Fig. 1 Trends of consumer price indexes according to consuming in particular 
public services (2003–2012). Source STADAT COICOP indexes, 2013
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and Similie’s generalised classification (2014). There are two basic specific 
contractual models on the extension of the private sector in public ser-
vices. The traditional French legal practice is based on lease and conces-
sion contracts. The German model prefers corporative structures in which 
the operating assets are corporatised and where in the asset holding com-
pany the private providing company (the operator of the concession) is a 
minority shareholder at the same time. From the second half of 1990s the 
German model was followed in Hungary, with the difference being that 
not only operating but also core assets (pipelines, networking works) were 
corporatised in many situations. The importance of this kind of systemic 
failure was realised about fifteen years later when it became clear that mul-
tinational private companies have a strong position mainly in the situation 
when municipalities as local clients wanted to shift their contracts.
“Who is responsible for this situation?” The question was raised in 
the systemic turn from 2010, because the solution was against the basic 
legal regulation of the local government act of 1990, which was passed at 
the beginning of system transition. Core assets should have been kept in 
municipal ownership because marketing was prohibited by the law. There 
are different answers on the responsibility question from the government 
side, which are as follows:
(a)  Former governments. Privatisation had been preferred by central 
government for many terms before 2010. However, public utility 
assets had not yet been registered at all. Content of ownership was 
not defined earlier, especially during the long period of state social-
ism, where this kind of specification was not in question at all. So, 
the registry court registered memorandums of new private sector 
providing companies, without any questions in many situations.
(b)  City leaders and politicians who were in office at that time. The 
new government accused its predecessors of consciously selling 
off assets, directly furthering only their own interests.
(c)  Foreign investors. According to the political rhetoric, international 
professional companies wanted to obtain a monopoly in order to 
gain extra profits and only foreign interests were represented by 
them. It has been emphasised by the government in power since 
2010 that some of the West European governments and Länder 
(German federal member states) are also shareholders in quite a 
few utility companies providing services in Hungarian cities and 
regional areas.
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These above-mentioned motives have been inspired by the policy of 
restructuring in the public service corporate sector during the era of the 
nationalist government since 2010.
reorgaNisatioN iN the corPorate sector (iNPut chaNges)
There have been three basic fields of corporate reorganisation in the 
Hungarian public utility sector recently: (i) by exclusive rights and bur-
dens against international monopolies (ii) cutting user charges and (iii) 
reallocation of ownership in the sector.
Acts2 passed by the Parliament supported this policy directly through 
redefining and narrowing groups of authorised providers service by 
service. In further steps, consumer fees payable by individuals were 
restricted by the central government by means of direct influence in the 
market for delivery of services, neglecting any regular tools of regulatory 
authorities. Municipalities and the national government directly forced 
buy-back of shares of providing companies from foreign private investors.
(i)  Exclusive rights and special taxes. All of the new integrated pro-
viders obtained exclusive rights to provide particular services of 
general economic interests. This action is allowed by the second-
ary law of the EU. However, in the second phase of restructur-
ing, from 2012, several measures were undertaken by the national 
government to centralise profits from the energy, water, waste 
and other (funeral, park maintenance, chimney sweeping services) 
public utility sectors. This is done by levying special central taxes. 
Providers are now burdened with taxes levied on public utility net-
works on the basis of the length of pipes. There is an exemption 
if the company is 100% publically owned. Discrimination may be 
identified in several of the legal procedures, however so far this has 
not been an obstacle for the implementation of the obligations. 
Additionally, even municipality-owned providers are burdened 
with other taxes, like additional income tax on waste manage-
ment (this burden is also placed upon energy companies), taxes on 
vacant sites, fees on waste disposal in landfills and so on. In these 
cases the aim of the central government must have been to cen-
tralise business profits, especially not to leave them to municipal 
owners.
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(ii)  User charges. Another phase of the reorganisation in the service 
providing environment started from the beginning of 2013. From 
that time the central government has in four waves decreased the 
consumer fees of particular utility services payable by individual 
residential users.
 The centrally ordered cut on tariffs of utility services was about a 
nominal 10–25%. Direct regulation of user charges for utility services 
became a major focus of the Orbán government and one of its key 
policy aims. This popular policy (“decreasing burdens on families”) 
was also placed in the centre of the political agenda in order to win 
the 2014 elections. It was a very successful strategy from the nation-
alist right wing point of view in the general, EU and subsequent 
local elections. The political (and not policy) motivation is empha-
sised by the government in the way that the calculations for the sav-
ings of households are prescribed to be put on the official receipt 
sent out on a monthly basis. The law even requires a coloured (!) 
background for this notice in order to make sure customers pay 
enough attention to the effect of the government intervention.
 Now let us see the effect of the cut. Table 2 shows the change of 
customer price indexes in recent years.
 The reduction is lower in each item than is prescribed by the law. This 
must be explained by reference to the discount for individual con-
sumers only. Legal persons and other undertakings have to pay the 
full price. Nevertheless, their rate is higher now than the original user 
charge before the direct regulation. In contrast, energy prices have in 
fact decreased on the world market. In addition, different supplemen-
tary services (change of water metre, controls etc.) are more expensive, 
especially for non-residents. Consequently, the level of service provi-
sion is not rising or is effectively worse than it was before. Providers try 
to escape from the barriers of regulation. For instance, waste collection 
companies went back to the phase of a fixed frequency-based monthly 
charge from the existing quantity-based regime.
 A clear evaluation of these input changes is shown by the fact that 
a third of existing solid waste management companies (171 in 
2016) are working at a loss as a result of the described manage-
ment policy.
(iii)  Redistribution of influence on ownership in the public utility sector. 
At the very beginning of the era in new government, policies on 
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municipalities, mainly on cities, were shifted. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, party affiliation was the same as that at the central 
government level. The performance of utility companies was criti-
cised heavily here. The main argument arose as follows:
• high level of consumer fees in comparison,
• little contribution to local municipal revenues,
• dirty businesses,
• liability problems in public contracts.
The answers on these conflicts are different depending on the original 
ownership position of the state sector. If municipalities sold at least part 
of their shares earlier, then they wanted to buy back providing companies 
and the exclusive rights on the delivery of particular services from private 
owners and managing companies. In cases of companies remaining in 
the hands of local governments, changes of corporate management were 
imposed, leading to the establishment of general asset holding companies.
In the countryside, amalgamation of service providers occurred under 
the umbrella of municipally or centrally owned companies. Private 
Table 1 Timetable of the decrease of user charges to individual consumers 
(according to particular laws)
Source Based on Szemesi (2016), 285–286, prepared in the author’s MTA–DE PSRG
Provided service Date of decrease (from) Change to price Dec. 2012
Electricity 01.01.2013 90%
01.11.2013 80%
01.09.2014 75.44%
Gas (pipeline) 01.01.2013 90%
01.11.2013 80%
01.04.2014 74.80%
District heating Change to price Nov. 2012
01.01.2013 90%
01.11.2013 80%
01.10.2014 77.37%
Drinking water Change to price Jan. 2013
01.07.2013 90%
Solid waste Change to price Apr. 2012
01.07.2013 93.78%
Liquid waste Change to price Jan. 2012
01.07.2013 90%
Chimney sweeping Change to price Dec. 2012
01.07.2013 90%
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investors were forced by the government with sector laws on different 
public services to sell their majority shares. For instance, as a result the 
number of providers in solid waste management decreased by 80% from 
2007 to 2014. This has meant the integration of delivery service, in 
addition to change in the identity of the owners.
direct (outPut) chaNges
The whole process of (re)transformation in the public utility sector can 
be summarised as follows. The central government is extremely active 
in making rules for the economic environment of public utility ser-
vice provision in this country. Since 2010, several measures have been 
undertaken to centralise profits from the energy, water, waste and other 
(funeral, park maintenance, chimney sweeping services) public utility 
 sectors.
Providers are now burdened with a central tax levied on public utility 
networks. The general cut in prices of user charges is supplementary and a 
new supervisory fee has been introduced for an administrative regulatory 
authority. Additionally, municipal utilities were exempted from some of the 
taxes, but this is no longer the case and the financial burden for municipal 
utilities is now heavier. Although maintenance costs are covered by user 
charges, tariffs are however defined by Parliament and the government. 
As far as working capital investments are concerned, because the com-
pany is fully owned by municipalities or the state, paradoxically, national 
and European Union grants were more easily available because no further 
guarantee was needed for keeping the new utilities in public hands.
The national government obtained ownership in two ways. First, it 
was done by buying back shares from foreign investors, pressing them by 
reallocation in the market environment. It took place mainly in gas, elec-
tricity and water services. Second, this policy is also implemented by tak-
ing over shares from municipalities, as happened in water, waste, waste 
water and chimney sweeping services. This latter strategy focused on ser-
vices for residents.
The further aim of the national government seems to be to shift pub-
lic utilities to non-profit-making services. In this case, neither the role 
of municipalities nor the providers’ presumed counter interest has been 
specified. This process must have an effect on the public service level in a 
medium-term perspective.
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The logic framework of the whole transfer of the system was tested 
in detail by our primary analyses.3 In a representative sample, residents 
were questioned about the conditioned content and the expected results 
of the reduction of consumer fees in public utility services by central 
government. A sample of 1200 residents were interviewed in 2013 and 
2015 by the professional public opinion research institute in the frame-
work of our project.
Questions were asked as to the effects of the cutting of consumer 
prices. The residents agreed that owners should not get too high a level 
of profit. They also expressed hope at making incentives for providers 
more effective. However, opinion on restriction in renewal and develop-
ment is more and more realised. There is a significant rise from the first 
to the second survey in the ratio of those who anticipated declining lev-
els of service provision. Data are shown in Table 3.
Finally (by 2015) opinion about cutting consumer prices had become a 
little worse (Table 4). This means fewer people thought that it was a very 
good decision, and a higher ratio now thought it a bad or very bad decision.
Although decisions of government may be very favourable to them, 
consumers’ significant ratio faces future negative effects.
Table 3 Effects of cutting consumer prices according to public opinion
The effect of cutting con-
sumer prices is…
Mean (scale of 4) Ratio of fully or almost  
agreeing (4, 3)
2013 2015 2013 2015
To prevent owners from 
getting too high profit
2.93 2.82 68.1% 62.0%
To make incentives for 
public utility companies to 
work more effectively
2.65 2.76 56.1% 60.3%
That less resources remain 
for renewal and develop-
ment of networks
2.71 2.75 55.6% 60.1%
That service level is going 
to be lower and less guar-
anteed
2.57 2.54 51.2% 62.9%
How do you agree with that…
fully agree=4 …fully disagree=1, mean of valid answers; sample 1200
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iNdirect (far-reachiNg) chaNges
There are also indirect effects of the official public utility policy. First, 
infringement procedures by the European Commission are taking place4 
because prices are defined by the ministry instead of the regulatory author-
ity. In addition, specific taxes, like a tax on the length of pipe networks and 
energy transaction fees, must not be calculated as an accepted cost.
Second, the competition aspect is challenged. There are different 
prices for individuals and for undertakings, which appears to be discrimi-
nation. Newly established huge state-owned enterprises are in a bet-
ter position in tenders, avoiding formal public procurement processes. 
Several antitrust procedures have been initiated for this reason. Although 
keeping state aid rules is also questioned, there are fewer of these kinds 
of disputes in European institutions.
Third, international investment disputes are taking place, because 
semi-nationalisation procedures under the new state-owned property act 
and the actions of municipalities and the national state are questioned by 
private, especially foreign, investors.
Fourth, an indirect effect has been highlighted. Charges in the global 
market of the energy sector have decreased, while the Hungarian govern-
ment froze prices at a static level.
Fifth, the government’s own public relations and propaganda focuses 
on the cutting of charges in the utility sector. It is one of the key issues 
of the campaign called “The Hungarian reforms are working!”. The 
most important figures that show the savings are required to be printed 
on receipts sent to householders monthly. This policy has been an impor-
tant strategy of the national government since the beginning of 2013.
Sixth, some sector providers have become bankrupt, in such areas as 
chimney sweeping, as well as many waste companies. In these cases the 
Table 4 Evaluation 
of the decision to 
cut consumer prices 
according to the public 
N = 1200
Source data survey 2013 and 2015 (the authors’ data)
Cutting of consumer prices 2013 2015
it is not known 5.5% 5.5%
it was a very bad decision 2.6% 4.6%
it was a bad decision 10.1% 15.9%
it was a good decision 50.3% 50.4%
it was a very good decision 31.5% 23.6%
total 100.0% 100.0%
mean 3.17 2.98
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national authority of civil defence becomes responsible for fulfilling pub-
lic tasks, neglecting market actors all together.
All in all, according to experts and scholars (Pappas 2014; Szelényi 
and Csillag 2015; Hajnal and Rosta 2016), the legality deficit is quite 
serious in general in this situation whether in the economic or political 
field. The tactics of the government have been realised mostly with “suc-
cess”, because legal procedures are long term for example, four–six years 
are needed, while advantages are realised in financial and interest-based 
power games. The price of it is to be paid by the public as a whole.
LessoNs LearNt
Table 5 summarises the mentioned phenomena, grouping and adding 
non-anticipated (non-intended) effects. As has already been shown, it is 
difficult in this case to term the actions of the government “reforms”, 
because the focus of the measures is more the reassessment of former 
preferences rather than improvement as such. As Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán said in his speech at the national celebration on 15 March 2016, 
“our results cannot be measured only with utilisation, but the totality 
Table 5 Evaluation of reform/reassessment on the basis of the scrutinised case
Source Edited by the author
[Reform]/
Reassessment
Input changes Output changes Far-reaching changes
[Intended]/
Anticipated by gov-
ernment efforts
•  Enhancing public 
ownership
• Exclusive rights
• Special taxes
•  PR against private 
monopolies
•  Amalgamation of 
providers
•  Change elites in 
corporate manage-
ment
•  Cut of user 
charges
•  Neglecting com-
petition
• Nationalisation
•  Restriction in the 
EU integration
[Unintended]/
Non-anticipated 
(but expected?) by 
government efforts
•  Increasing transac-
tion costs
•  Constraints on 
increasing the 
service level
•  Decrease of mort-
gage rates
•  Bankrupting 
providers
•  Infringement 
procedures
•  International 
investment disputes
•  Drop of consumer 
orientation
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should be our preference”. That is why reassessment is a better term, 
supplemented with reforms, to characterise the process in policymaking, 
instead of highlighting real sector policies.
It must be clear from Table 5 that anticipated far-reaching objectives 
are very much interest-based. Comparing anticipated and non-anticipated 
aims we can conclude that the advantages of the intended effects are dis-
tributed to particular social and economic groups, while disadvantages are 
placed upon others.
Are these investigated actions really reforms or simply a package of 
intervention in order to achieve political aims? First, according to our 
research, at least we are sure to state that as a result of the implementa-
tion of utility policies recently in Hungary, service levels did not improve. 
Our starting hypothesis that the reform rhetoric of NPM is not working 
in these circumstances, because the orientation of changes is clearly out of 
the question of public service performance, seems to have been proved.
Second, this failure is not based on lack of clarification. Goals of the 
government were clear enough and these were realised in a quite systemic 
way. Nevertheless, either competition in liberalised markets or consumer 
orientation are simply neglected by these aims; instead, clear values of eco-
nomic and political power are preferred on public utility service provision.
Notes
1.  Orbán’s speech in Tusnádfürdő (Baile Tusnad, Romania, 26.07.2014) 
about his political programme to an exclusive audience in Transylvania. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-6n1G8ls.
2.  See the list of the acts in the Annex.
3.  The whole following empirical analysis is based on the author’s primary 
research, funded by OTKA (cited in the footnote 1).
4.  http://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/third-energy-package/.
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